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The European Union is currently negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with 
six African, Caribbean and Pacific country groupings, aiming at establishing mutual free 
trade. This paper empirically assesses the impact of the EPAs on trade flows and government 
revenues for 22 East and Southern African countries and discusses implications for intra-
regional integration. The results indicate that while moderate trade effects can be expected, 
relatively large budget effects are likely to occur in a number of these countries, exposing 
them to considerable structural and financial adjustment requirements. Also, EPAs would 
strengthen the need to consolidate overlapping intra-regional integration schemes. 
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 11.  Introduction 
The Cotonou Agreement, which was signed in June 2000, foresees negotiations on the 
establishment of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) countries and the European Union (EU). Non-reciprocal EU-preferences 
granted to ACP countries under the preceding Lomé Conventions have turned out to be 
incompatible with World Trade Organisation (WTO) regulations, as they discriminate against 
developing countries outside the ACP group (Onguglo and Ito 2003). Moreover, they cannot 
be conceived as a free trade agreement due to lack of reciprocity. For current non-reciprocal 
trade preferences, the European Commission has obtained another WTO waiver until the end 
of 2007 (WTO 2001). 
To ensure compatibility with multilateral rules, the Economic Partnership Agreements aim to 
establish reciprocal free trade agreements. In other words, not only will the EU provide tariff-
free access to its markets for ACP exports, but ACP countries will also be expected to provide 
tariff-free access to their own markets for EU exports. The new agreements are supposed to 
enter into force by January 2008 (ACP/EC 2001). For ACP countries which are not ready to 
enter into an EPA, an alternative framework for trade has to be provided, which should be 
equivalent to their existing situation and in conformity with WTO rules. 
Apart from the incompatibility with multilateral trade rules, there is a widespread perception 
that Europe’s preferences offered to the ACP countries have not really benefited most of 
them. In fact, the share of EU imports from ACP countries as compared to total EU imports 
fell from 7.9 per cent in 1980 to 2.8 per cent in 2004 (EUROSTAT 2005). This can partly be 
explained by the erosion of EU preferences due to general tariff liberalisation under 
multilateral agreements. However, it also has become clear that most ACP countries lack the 
productive and technological capacities, marketing skills, transportation channels, and 
appropriate technical and sanitary regulations to harness the opportunities offered by Europe’s 
tariff preferences. EPAs are supposed to address all these issues while at the same time 
enhancing the preferential access that ACP countries already enjoy in European markets.  
The first phase of EPA negotiations started in February 2002 on an ACP-wide scale, 
addressing horizontal issues of interest to all parties, such as principles and objectives of 
EPAs, scope and coverage of the issues as well as the modalities for co-operation (European 
Commission 2006). Since October 2003, inter-regional negotiations between the European 
 2Union and six regional ACP-groupings, that is, four in Africa and one each in the Pacific and 
the Caribbean, are under way, aiming at drafting detailed agreements. A joint roadmap has 
been set up for each ACP-grouping, comprising a schedule, an institutional framework, an 
agenda of the coverage and areas of priorities for the negotiation process (European 
Commission 2005a). 
In the East and Southern African region, on which this paper focuses, two separate regional 
EPA-groupings have been formed: (1) the Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) Group, 
comprising 16 member countries of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA);
1 and (2) the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Group,2 
consisting of four of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) members (Botswana, 
Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland, or SACU minus South Africa) and three neighbouring 
SADC countries (Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania). 
Negotiations are hampered by the fact that these two EPA negotiating groups do not coincide 
with the current memberships of existing regional integration schemes. Instead, they represent 
an alternative delineation that cuts across and splits current regional trade arrangements, 
which in themselves have problems of overlapping memberships. Apart from the fact that six 
COMESA members belong as well to SADC, the three EAC members are split in their dual 
membership to COMESA and SADC. Therefore, EPAs negotiating groups will also have 
effects on the ongoing regional integration efforts, which further complicates the negotiations. 
Like most of the ACP economies, East and Southern African countries have strong economic 
ties with Europe. In terms of trade, the EU’s share of total exports from the region accounts 
for 44 per cent, whereas imports from the European Union amount to 23 per cent of total 
imports.
3 As for financial links, the European Union is a major source of official aid, 
delivering 41 per cent of total and 63 per cent of bilateral flows to ESA and SADC countries, 
and providing 95 per cent of total inward foreign direct investment flows.
4 Mutual free trade 
through EPAs would certainly strengthen these economic and financial links, since trade and 
                                                 
1 COMESA has currently 20 members in total. 
2 Even though it is called SADC Group, it does not represent all SADC member countries. There are six SADC 
member countries that will negotiate under ESA Group (Democratic Republic of Congo, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Seychelles, Zambia and Zimbabwe). For simplicity, we use the term “East and Southern Africa” for all 23 
countries in the region that intend to negotiate regional EPAs. 
3 Percentages are based on averages for the period 1999 to 2003 (ITC 2005). 
 3investment flows (and financial assistance) are likely to increase in well-designed free trade 
areas. Yet EPAs pose a major challenge to African ACP countries, as domestic firms would 
have to cope with an increase in (import) competition, and governments with a potential 
decline in customs revenues. 
So far, there are very few studies available that try to quantify the impact of EPAs on ACP 
countries. Most studies focus more on policy options for ACP countries and/or discuss EPAs 
from a more general development perspective. For East Africa, Milner et al. (2005) estimate 
the (static) welfare impact of a regional EPA with the European Union for Kenya, Tanzania 
and Uganda, using a partial equilibrium model. Their results indicate that in the case of 
complete elimination of tariff barriers for EU imports, all three East African countries are 
likely to observe small changes in welfare levels. However, a negative effect arises due to 
decreasing tariff revenue from EU imports. On the positive side, consumers may benefit from 
declining prices caused by lower import prices and increased competition; however, this 
cannot compensate for the lost tariff revenue. The authors emphasise in their policy 
conclusions that their findings have to be interpreted with caution, as severe data restrictions 
limited the choice of the model used and may have affected the reliability of the estimated 
effects. 
Karingi et al. (2005), on the other hand, analyse the impact of the EPAs on all African ACP 
countries, using both a simple general equilibrium as well as a partial equilibrium model. Due 
to a limited number of social accounting matrices for African economies, which are necessary 
for any general equilibrium analysis, they encounter severe data problems in their estimation. 
As a consequence, only 7 out of 46 African ACP economies are included in the analysis. 
However, this restriction does not apply to the partial equilibrium model, which they apply to 
39 African ACP countries. Overall, they find that market integration will result in small 
positive welfare effects, but losses in tariff revenue can be considerable for individual African 
countries. 
In another study, Keck and Piermartini (2005) estimate the impact of the EPAs in SADC 
countries. Using a general equilibrium model and focussing on six SADC countries, they find 
that the EPAs are welfare enhancing overall, leading to a substantive increase in real gross 
domestic product. Similar to Karingi and associates, Keck and Piermartini also mention that 
                                                                                                                                                          
4 Likewise, averages for 1999-2003 (OECD 2005). 
 4the data in the social accounting matrices for African countries has to be viewed with caution. 
Moreover, general equilibrium models require a large number of parameters (elasticities), 
which are usually not available for these countries. Researchers usually circumvent this 
problem by using figures that have been estimated for high-income countries, but no one can 
be sure whether this procedure is appropriate for low-income African economies. Any results 
based on these models, therefore, may be subject to considerable error margins. 
In our study, we estimate the trade and budget effects of the proposed EPAs on East and 
Southern African countries, which belong to either ESA or SADC. For our analysis, we use 
an appropriate partial equilibrium model and address some of the shortcomings in previous 
studies. Importantly, we identify the products that are most affected by the proposed EPAs. 
Moreover, we highlight the need to consolidate regional trading arrangements in East and 
Southern Africa, not only for the EPA negotiations, but also to achieve successful south-south 
preferential trade arrangements. 
The paper is organised as follows: The next section provides an overview of current trade 
protection levels as well as preferential trade agreements in the region. Subsequently, the data 
and the empirical model used for the analysis are introduced in Section 3, whereas the 
empirical results are presented in Section 4. It is important to note that the analysis focuses on 
the impact of the EPAs on East and Southern Africa only and not on the European Union, as 
the impact on the latter is likely to be rather small. Based on the results, Section 5 discusses 
various policy options for East and South African countries as well as the need to consolidate 
the existing regional integration structure. 
 
2.  Trade Policy and Regional Trade Agreements in East and Southern Africa  
Since the mid 1990s, a number of East and Southern African countries have made remarkable 
progress in liberalising their external sector. Trade reforms took place unilaterally,
5 bilaterally 
and/or on a multilateral basis. Thus, countries in the region have reduced or eliminated non-
tariff barriers, such as import and export quotas, bans, or state trading. For instance, by the 
end of the 1990s, most SADC countries had eliminated all non-tariff barriers that were in 
                                                 
5 Many of the trade liberalisation measures that took place during the 1990s were implemented as part of the 
conditionalities inserted in Structural Adjustment Programs imposed by the Bretton Woods institutions. 
 5place at the beginning of the decade, with the exception of restrictions related to health, 
environmental and security reasons. Moreover, many SADC countries have substantially 
reduced maximum and average import tariffs. Average import-weighted tariff rates are now in 
the range of 8 to 11 per cent, with only Lesotho above that range (Table 1).
6 Among ESA 
countries, Madagascar, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia have the lowest trade taxes 
(less than 10 per cent), whereas Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti and the Seychelles still apply 
import-weighted tariffs of above 20 per cent. 
Table 1: Trade and Tariff Indicators 
   Import-weighted Import-weighted Imports 
 Base  tariff  rates  (%) tariff rates (%) from the EU
Group / country  year   total imports EU imports % of total imports
ESA group    
Burundi* 2002  21.0 20.8 42.5 
Comoros* 2001  38.9 38.9 43.5 
Congo, Dem. Rep.* 2003  12.1 11.3 41.4 
Djibouti* 2002  26.7 27.8 32.7 
Ethiopia* 2002  13.5 13.1 30.4 
Kenya 2001  13.3 12.1 33.1 
Madagascar* 2001  3.2 4.0 31.9 
Malawi* 2001  11.6 10.0 15.0 
Mauritius 2002  13.0 17.0 27.2 
Rwanda* 2003  6.6 8.8 26.0 
Seychelles 2000  23.4 35.6 28.9 
Sudan* 2002  19.6 16.6 37.6 
Uganda* 2003  7.2 5.0 18.6 
Zambia* 2003  9.4 6.4 19.4 
Zimbabwe 2001  10.5 13.0 11.2 
    
SADC group    
Angola* 2002  8.0 8.5 49.7 
Botswana 2001  9.6 3.4 9.0 
Lesotho* 2001  17.5 3.1 7.4 
Mozambique* 2002  8.9 8.0 22.9 
Namibia 2001  10.7 4.4 6.0 
Swaziland 2001  10.5 11.5 1.0 
Tanzania 2003  8.2 8.7 19.6 
Sources: UNCTAD (2005) and, for Comoros, IMF (2005). Notes: Figures for Eritrea are not available. *Least-
developed country. 
 
Parallel to the general trend of unilateral trade liberalisation and simplification of their trade 
regimes, during the last decade we have witnessed a real renaissance of regional trade 
integration across East and Southern Africa. In 2000 COMESA established a free trade 
                                                 
6 Note that these figures refer to import-weighted tariff rates, which differ from simple averages. For that reason, 
SACU customs union members have different (import-weighted) tariff rates. 
 6agreement for nine of its members, later joined by Rwanda and Burundi. Despite the relative 
success of the agreement, progress towards establishing a COMESA customs union has been 
minimal, and it is very uncertain whether this endeavour would ever succeed. SADC 
countries also signed the SADC Trade Protocol, which envisages the establishment of a free 
trade agreement among its member states by 2008, through the asymmetrical liberalisation of 
less than 90 per cent of its total intra-regional trade. However, the agreement is asymmetrical, 
most member countries are far behind schedule, a wide range of sensitive products are 
excluded from the agreement, and rules of origin are restrictive for several critical sectors 
(Flatters 2002).  
In the East African context, after years of complex negotiations and various delays, Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda finally launched a customs union on 1 January 2005. The common 
external tariff of the new East African Community has been generally set at lower average 
tariffs, and the gradual liberalisation of their intra-regional trade regimes is supposed to 
proceed over the next five years. 
In spite of all these developments, the share of intra-regional trade of the ESA region’s total 
trade increased marginally in all trading blocks, and is substantially lower – some 10 per cent 
in 2002 (Yagci and Aldaz 2004) – compared to regional trading blocks in other parts of the 
world. Moreover, the bulk of the increased intra-regional trade are concentrated in only two 
countries: South Africa and Kenya. Both countries supply a large part of the intra-regional 
exports, while receiving only a small proportion of the imports.  
From our point of view, there are at least three reasons that could explain the low levels of 
regional trade in the face of proliferating agreements. First of all, there is a huge gap between 
formal agreements and actual implementation. In various countries, the record of 
implementation of treaties, protocols and agreements is far from satisfactory. African 
governments have repeatedly committed themselves to unrealistic and unfeasible agreements 
which have ultimately damaged the credibility of the integration process (e.g., COMESA 
customs union, or the more recent plan to establish an East African Federation by 2010). 
Much of the failure to implement the agreements has to do with concerns about losing much 
needed customs revenue. What is more worrying, most regional organisations in charge of 
enforcing the ambitious mandates entrusted to them in their treaties and protocols lack the 
resources to do so. 
 7A second problem lies in the existence of multiple, overlapping and often conflicting regional 
integration arrangements within the same region, which continues to make implementation 
very difficult and imposes a heavy burden on limited administrative resources in the member 
countries (Figure 1). This problem has been aggravated by the configuration of the groupings 
set up to negotiate EPAs with the EU, which effectively have divided regional trade 
arrangements. Either essential rationalisation and harmonisation of agreements take place, or 
some regional trade arrangements may become irrelevant in the wider ESA and EPA context.  
Finally, although important progress has been made in removing tariff barriers through the 
regional trade agreements, much less attention has been devoted to the numerous non-tariff 
and non-border measures that most countries impose on one another, preventing any 
substantial increase of intra-regional trade flows.  













































Source: de la Rocha (2003). Note: * Democratic Republic of Congo. 
 
 
 83.  Modelling Trade and Budget Effects of EPAs 
After highlighting trade protection levels and trade policy issues in the region, we next turn to 
the modelling framework used in the empirical analysis. As already mentioned in the first 
section, domestic production data for African countries, which is a prerequisite for a social 
accounting matrix, is of relatively poor quality or simply not available. For East and Southern 
Africa, we only have a social accounting matrix for 7 out of 23 countries.
7 Since our main 
objective is to analyse the effects of the EPAs on as many countries in the region as possible, 
a general equilibrium model is clearly not the best choice, even though it would be preferable 
from a theoretical point of view. 
As a remedy, we use Verdoorn’s (1960) partial equilibrium model to analyse the trade and 
fiscal effects of the proposed EPAs. Despite its age, it is an appropriate modelling framework, 
as it focuses on imports from different sources and leaves out domestic production data. It 
assumes that products are heterogeneous, namely, that they are imperfect substitutes in use. 
This assumption is reasonable for our analysis, because a vast majority of European exports to 
East and Southern Africa consists of manufactured goods (Table 2). Though there are 
differences at the country level, European firms export predominately manufactured 
commodities like transport and telecommunications equipment or electrical and non-electrical 
machinery, which are more likely to be differentiated by their country of origin than raw 
materials or agricultural goods. 
                                                 
7 Only Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe are included in the most 
recent 6.0 database of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP). 
 9Table 2: EU-East and Southern African Trade Structure, Percent of Total, 2002 
  EU exports to ESA/SADC countries  EU imports from ESA/SADC countries 
Group / country  Agriculture  Raw 
materials 
Manufactures Agriculture Raw 
materials 
Manufactures
ESA group  10.6  2.2  87.2  30.2  14.8  55.0 
Burundi* 10.4  6.5  83.1  87.1  5.9  7.0 
Comoros* 22.0  2.9  75.1  33.2  0.2  66.6 
Congo,  Dem.  Rep.*  28.8 4.8  66.5 0.6 11.3 88.0 
Djibouti*  37.6 3.6  58.8 8.6 17.1 74.3 
Eritrea* 15.4  2.4  82.2  24.8  12.0  63.3 
Ethiopia* 6.1  1.7  92.2  37.9  11.7  50.4 
Kenya 4.0  9.4  86.7  60.6  30.2  9.3 
Madagascar* 14.5  4.6  80.9  58.1  5.6  36.3 
Malawi* 4.9  1.0  94.1  97.0  1.0  2.1 
Mauritius 10.6  1.3  88.1  32.5  0.4  67.1 
Rwanda* 7.4  4.8  87.8  76.2  9.8  14.0 
Seychelles 37.8  3.5  58.8  87.7  4.9  7.4 
Sudan* 7.7  3.3  88.9  18.3  70.5  11.2 
Uganda* 6.0  4.6  89.4  79.9  13.7  6.4 
Zambia* 1.5  1.6  97.0  35.5  21.5  43.0 
Zimbabwe 2.4  2.0  95.6  56.1  21.7  22.2 
           
SADC group  13.6  3.6  82.8  49.6  14.8  35.5  
Angola*  22.6 4.4  73.0 1.8 73.4 24.8 
Botswana  0.1 0.0  99.9 2.3  0.1 97.6 
Lesotho* 20.3  0.0  79.7  45.5  0.0  54.5 
Mozambique* 3.2  1.1  95.7  14.1  3.3  82.6 
Namibia 11.0  1.9  87.1  46.2  2.9  50.9 
Tanzania 6.3  5.8  87.9  71.1  9.3  19.6 
           
ESA + SADC**  12.8  3.2  84.0  44.3  14.8  40.8 
Sources: ITC (2005) and own calculations. Notes: Figures for Swaziland are not available. *Least-developed 
country. **unweighted average. 
 
Moreover, using a partial equilibrium model offers the advantage of the analysis being 
performed at a more disaggregated level, thereby allowing us to identify the products that are 
most affected by an EPA. Apart from assuming heterogeneous goods, Verdoorn’s model is 
based on the normal assumptions of partial equilibrium analysis, for instance, no changes in 
income or exchange rates and, in its simplified version, infinite supply elasticities. The latter 
assumption is acceptable, as the EU is a large economy and its exports to East and Southern 
Africa accounted for only 0.3 per cent of total EU exports in 2002 (ITC 2005). Other major 
exporters to East and Southern African countries are the United States and Asian countries 
like Japan, which are all large exporters as well. Any change in exports to East and Southern 
Africa as a share of total production is likely to be very small, therefore infinite supply 
elasticities is a reasonable assumption. 
 10Verdoorn’s model distinguishes between imports from preference beneficiaries (Q1) and from 
non-beneficiaries (Q2), which add up to total imports (Q). The model is based on two key 
equations: First, the demand function of the preference donor can be written as: 
(1)                                                       α   ε P   α   ε P   β     Q     Q     Q
2 1
2 1 2 1 = = +  
where P1 and P2 denote the prices of beneficiaries’ and non-beneficiaries’ imports, α1 and α2 
are share coefficients (α1 = Q1/(Q1+Q2) and α1+α2 = 1), β is a parameter and ε represents the 
elasticity of import demand. 
Second, the elasticity of substitution (σ) of preferred and non-preferred imports is defined as: 
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we can express changes in preferred and non-preferred imports as follows: 
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Using (5),  and (α ) 0 P ˆ ( 2 = 1+α2 = 1), (3) can be written as 
() (5)                                                          
t 1
dt
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The total change in preferred imports can be split into two effects: First, a trade creation (TC) 
effect, which is usually defined as the increase in Q1 due to (a) an increase in overall 
 11consumption and (b) the displacement of domestic production, as prices for preferred imports 
decline. From the preferred country’s point of view, this effect can be written as follows: 
(7)                                                                  
t 1
dt







= =  
Second, trade diversion (TD) is defined as the substitution of preferred for non-preferred 
imports. This further effect can be obtained from (4), using (5) and  :   ) 0 P ˆ ( 2 =
(8)                                                              
t 1
dt







= =  
In addition to the trade effects, East and Southern African countries will observe a decline in 
customs revenue (CR) due to the preferential tariff elimination. The reduction is equal to the 
sum of imports from preferred countries and the change in non-preferred imports, both 
multiplied by the import tariff: 
( ) (9)                                                                 t         TD   Q CR   d    1+ =  
The estimation of trade creation and diversion and of changes in customs revenue has been 
conducted at the two-digit level of the Harmonised System. At that level of aggregation, the 
schedule consists of 97 groups of goods. For trade diversion effects, this approach allows a 
more accurate estimation, since we take competition from importing countries at a 
disaggregated level into account. In a similar fashion, it enables us to identify those goods that 
would be particularly affected by the proposed EPAs.  
Among ESA countries, only Eritrea had to be excluded from the empirical investigation, as 
tariff and (reliable) trade data were not available. Consequently, the analysis has been 
undertaken for a total of 22 out of 23 East and Southern African countries that belong to 
either the ESA or the SADC EPA negotiating grouping with the EU. The base year is 2003, 
the most recent year for which trade and tariff data were available.
8
Rather than estimating import demand and substitution elasticities, we had to assume 
appropriate figures for them, due to a lack of reliable data. More specifically, we used figures 
                                                 
8 See the Appendix for data sources for all variables. 
 12that have been estimated for a range of other developing countries and differentiated between 
agricultural goods, raw materials and manufactures, as the elasticities for these product groups 
are likely to differ (Table 3).
9 For instance, raw materials like oil products or gas are much 
more homogeneous than specialised machinery. Given income levels and the import structure 
in East and Southern Africa, the elasticities of substitution will be higher than the import 
demand elasticity, since competition among exports of manufactured commodities from the 
European Union, the United States, and Japan to East and Southern Africa is likely to be 
much stiffer than competition between European and African producers. 
 
Table 3: Assumed Values for Elasticities, Two-digit Level of Harmonised System 




Agricultural products (01-24)  -0.7  -1.4 
Raw materials (25-27)  -0.9  -3.0 
Manufactured goods (28-97)  -1.1  -2.0 
 
Importantly, we corrected import-weighted tariffs, as import duties are not always (entirely) 
collected. Because of exemptions, such as special trade preferences in export-processing 
zones or for foreign direct investment, and/or deficiencies in the duty collection due to red 
tape, smuggling or corruption, tariff rates and effectively applied tariff rates may differ. Based 
on the IMF Staff Reports and IMF country resources (IMF 2005), we computed collection 
ratios, that is, the share of duty collected of the c.i.f. value of imports. Collection ratios vary 
significantly in East and Southern Africa, ranging from 2.1 per cent in Madagascar to 20.0 per 
cent in Comoros (Table 4). Subsequently, we have calculated collection efficiency ratios, that 
is, the percentage of the import-weighted tariff that has been collected. Using this measure, 
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland are particularly good performers, collecting 
almost 90 per cent of their statutory rates.
10 Comoros, Djibouti, Kenya, and Malawi, 
conversely, have a rather poor record in collection efficiency, with ratios below 60 per cent. 
                                                 
9 See Sawyer and Sprinkle (1999) for a survey of trade elasticities. More recent estimates can be found in Kee et 
al. (2004), Hertel et al. (2003) and Gallaway et al. (2003). For Comoros, we have used ε = -0.7 and σ = -2.0 for 
total imports, since no disaggregated data could be obtained. 
10 We have computed a single collection efficiency ratio for Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland, since 
all of them are members of the SACU customs union, sharing customs duties according to an agreement with 
South Africa and a specific formula. See Kirk and Stern (2005) for details. 
 13Crucial to the subsequent empirical results, only the actual collected import duties will be 




Table 4: Efficiency of Import Duty Collections  






ESA group   
Burundi* 16.2  77.1
Comoros* 20.0  51.5
Congo, Dem. Rep.* 9.4  77.4
Djibouti* 11.2  42.2
Ethiopia* 8.9  65.8
Kenya 6.9  52.3
Madagascar* 2.1  64.9
Malawi* 6.5  56.3
Mauritius 9.0  69.4
Rwanda* 5.2  78.8
Seychelles 15.5  66.4
Sudan* 17.3  88.2
Uganda* 4.8  86.7
Zambia* 7.6  80.6
Zimbabwe 7.9  75.4
  
SADC group   
Angola* 6.1  76.4
Botswana 8.6  89.4
Lesotho* 15.6  89.4
Mozambique* 6.2 69.8
Namibia 9.6  89.4
Swaziland 9.4  89.4
Tanzania 6.8  82.1
Sources: IMF (2005), UNCTAD (2005) and own calculations. Notes: 
1Percentage of duty collected of the c.i.f. value of imports. 
2Collection ratio 
divided by import-weighted tariff rate. *Least-developed country. 
 
4.  Empirical Results 
Under the likely terms of any EPA in East and Southern Africa, tariffs on EU imports are to 
be phased out gradually in the period from 2008 to 2020. Important for the following results, 
we focused on the final stage of tariff elimination rather than trying to estimate the impact of 
                                                 
11 Studies that have investigated the impact of trade liberalisation in Africa in the past, using import-weighted 
tariff rates, are likely to have arrived at biased estimates if collection ratios and tariff rates differ significantly. 
For example, none of the studies surveyed in the introduction has corrected for the discrepancies between the 
two rates. 
 
 14each stated cut. In addition, we assumed that a 100 per cent coverage ratio, that is, tariffs on 
all products, will be eliminated. This figure is, of course, an upper-bound estimate of the trade 
effects, since it is highly likely that East and Southern African countries would exclude 
certain products from the EPAs. In general, ACP countries have argued that no more than 80 
to 85 per cent of imports should be liberalised (Hinkle and Newfarmer 2005). This approach 
is feasible if the EU liberalises up to 100 per cent of its imports from Africa and the combined 
average arrives at some 90 per cent.12 Depending on the final outcome of the negotiations, 
the actual trade and budget effects will be smaller in comparison to the 100 per cent tariff 
elimination assumed in our analysis. Nevertheless, our results provide an idea about the 
potentially maximum magnitude of the effects. 
As can be seen from Table 5, the total trade effect, that is, the increase in EU exports to East 
and Southern African countries, is estimated to increase by US $643 million or 10.1 per cent 
with respect to current import values. In comparison to SADC countries, relative trade effects 
are somewhat larger in ESA countries, for the most part because protection levels vis-à-vis 
EU imports are lower in Southern Africa, that is, SACU members. At the country level, the 
effects range from 3.6 per cent in Lesotho to 20.7 per cent in Comoros. For a number of other 
countries, such as Burundi, Seychelles and Sudan, the estimated trade effects are in the range 
between 16 and 19 per cent. 
 
                                                 
12 Liberalisation of 90 per cent of trade flows is generally considered to comply with WTO regulations under 
Art. 24 which provides that Regional Trade Agreements should liberalise “substantially all trade between the 
parties”. 
 15Table 5: Trade Effects 
Group / country  Trade creation  Trade diversion Total trade effect
 mill.  US-$  %
1 mill. US-$ %
2 mill. US-$  %
1
    
ESA group 314.6  7.7 -151.4 -1.4 466.0 11.3
Burundi* 5.3  13.5 -1.5 -2.9 6.8  17.5
Comoros* 3.6  10.1 -3.8 -8.1 7.4  20.7
Congo, Dem. Rep.* 18.7  7.5 -7.0 -2.0 25.7  10.3
Djibouti* 12.7  8.8 -4.7 -1.6 17.5  12.0
Ethiopia* 37.2  7.7 -16.9 -1.5 54.1  11.2
Kenya 57.8  5.7 -28.4 -1.4 86.2  8.5
Madagascar* 4.1  2.6 -1.8 -0.5 5.9  3.7
Malawi* 4.3  5.2 -3.9 -0.8 8.2  9.8
Mauritius 54.7  9.3 -25.8 -1.6 80.5  13.6
Rwanda* 4.4  6.5 -2.2 -1.2 6.6  9.8
Seychelles 10.0  13.4 -2.1 -1.2 12.2 16.3
Sudan* 61.5  12.8 -29.2 -3.7 90.7  18.9
Uganda* 8.8  3.4 -5.6 -0.5 14.3  5.6
Zambia* 14.3  5.9 -8.0 -0.8 22.2  9.2
Zimbabwe 17.2  9.1 -10.5 -0.7 27.7  14.6
    
SADC group 121.0  5.3 -56.3 -0.8 177.4  7.8
Angola* 67.9  5.2 -27.0 -2.0 95.0  7.3
Botswana 4.9  3.1 -3.0 -0.2 7.9  5.1
Lesotho* 0.2  2.4 -0.1 -0.1 0.3  3.6
Mozambique* 15.5  5.4 -7.1 -0.7 22.6  7.9
Namibia 3.5  3.8 -2.7 -0.2 6.2  6.7
Swaziland 0.7  8.5 -0.4 -0.1 1.1  13.7
Tanzania 28.3  6.6 -16.0 -0.9 44.3  10.3
    
ESA + SADC  435.6  6.8  -207.7 -1.1  643.4  10.1 
Source: Own calculations. Notes: 
1of preferred imports. 
2of non-preferred imports. See Table 1 for base years. 
*Least-developed country. 
 
The percentage increases for trade creation range from 2.4 per cent for Lesotho to 
13.5 per cent for Burundi, whereas the (import-weighted) average for all East and Southern 
African countries amounts to 6.8 per cent. Non-beneficiary exporters would experience a 
decline in their shipments to East and Southern Africa by an average of 1.1 per cent, with 
country estimates in the range from 0.1 per cent for Lesotho to 8.1 per cent for Comoros. 
Apart from Comoros, trade creation exceeds trade diversion in absolute values in all 
countries. The larger trade creation figures seem to be at odds at first glance, since the 
assumed substitution elasticities are higher than the import demand elasticities. Using a 
disaggregated approach, however, ensures that competition among exporters to African 
countries, affected by tariff elimination, is taken into account at an appropriate level, which 
reduces potential trade diversion effects. Also, the trade diversion formula in Verdoorn’s 
model incorporates the share of non-preferential imports and corrects the substitution with the 
import demand elasticity, both of which reduce the magnitude of the trade diversion effects. 
 16The differences in the trade effects among the two EPA groupings in East and Southern 
Africa arise mainly because of diverging trade barriers vis-à-vis EU imports, differences in 
competition intensities at the product level, import structures and tariff collection efficiency 
ratios. The far above-average estimates for Comoros can be explained by its high (import-
weighted) tariffs with respect to EU imports (38.9 per cent). In contrast, the rather small trade 
effects in Lesotho and Madagascar are due to low tariff barriers for EU imports and – in the 
case of Madagascar – a relatively poor performance in collecting statutory tariff rates.  
To check for the robustness of these results, we could, for instance, double both the assumed 
values for the elasticity of substitution and the import demand elasticity for all three product 
categories, namely, agricultural products, raw materials and manufactured goods. As a 
consequence, trade creation and diversion would double as well.
13 Hence, we have to keep in 
mind that the assumptions regarding both elasticities are crucial for the expected trade effects. 
Even though the assumed values for both elasticities are well within the range of estimates for 
other developing countries, they are still assumptions and may contain a possible bias for the 
trade effects. 
In a further analysis, we have looked at commodities at the two-digit level of the Harmonised 
System that show far above-average trade effects. For this purpose, we have sorted all 
products by percentage changes in EU imports (total trade effect) in all individual countries. 
Subsequently, we have counted the total number of top ten listings for each product group 
across African countries (Table 6). To give an example, the product category 61, articles of 
apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted, is among the top ten most affected 
commodities in 16 out of 21 ESA and SADC countries.
14 Though affected product groups are 
spread over various commodities, there are a number of categories for apparel and clothing 
products as well as related products, such as footwear or headgear, that are affected in a 
considerable number of countries, indicating that this sector might be particularly affected by 
the proposed Economic Partnership Agreements. Furthermore, some of these groups of 
products, which as we said, will experience the highest increases in import volumes after the 
tariff liberalisation, are also locally produced in ESA and SADC countries, which may lead to 
                                                 
13 See equations (7) and (8). 
14 Comoros had to be excluded from the computation of the most affected products, as disaggregated tariff and 
trade were not available. Thus, the sample drops to 21 countries. 
 17a (partial) displacement of domestically produced goods. This applies in particular to apparel 
and clothing products.  
 





Number of top ten 
listings
1  
61  Articles of apparel & clothing access, knitted or crocheted  16 
66  Umbrellas, walking-sticks, seat-sticks, whips, etc.  14 
42  Articles of leather, saddlery/harness, travel goo  13 
62  Article of apparel & clothing access, not knitted or crocheted  12 
67  Prepared feathers & down, artificial flowers  11 
64  Footwear, gaiters and the like, parts thereof  10 
36  Explosives, pyrotechnic products, matches, etc.  7 
46  Manufactures of straw, other plaiting material  7 
57  Carpets and other textile floor coverings  7 
65  Headgear and parts thereof  7 
Source: Own calculations. Note: 
1Out of 21 countries. 
 
As trade creation is larger than trade diversion (apart from Comoros), East and Southern 
African countries may benefit from participating in an EPA. Based on Viner’s (1950) seminal 
contribution, trade creation is associated with a welfare gain, as it means a shift from a less to 
a more efficient supplier, whereas trade diversion can be associated with a welfare loss, since 
it implies a change in imports from a more efficient to a less efficient importer. In spite of 
this, we cannot reach any final conclusions about the welfare impact of the EPAs from the 
relative magnitudes of trade effects alone. Even in a partial equilibrium framework, the 
negative impact from subsequent terms-of-trade effects or losses in tariff revenue resulting 
from trade liberalisation might outweigh the increase in consumer surplus. 
Hence, we have to consider carefully any changes in government revenue, as the tariff 
elimination will reduce customs revenue. As shown in Table 7, the decline in import duties in 
absolute figures ranges from US $0.3 million in Lesotho to US $88.1 million in Angola.15 As 
a share of total import duties, the percentage figures vary considerably from some 1 per cent 
in Swaziland to 55 per cent Angola. With respect to the decline in import duties as a share of 
                                                 
15 Similar to the trade effects, our estimated budget effects are lower in comparison to those reported in previous 
studies that also use partial equilibrium models. The discrepancy can partly be explained by the fact that other 
studies have not corrected for inefficiencies in import duty collections. 
 18total government revenue, as it is expected the impact is higher in those countries, with higher 
tariff rates and higher dependence on trade taxes for their public revenue. Thus, Comoros and 
Djibouti in particular would face a severe impact on their public financial positions and their 
ability to provide public goods. Percentage declines in both countries amount to 24.5 and 14 
per cent, respectively. As can be seen from Tables 1 and 7, the reasons for the far above-
average (relative) decline in both countries’ import duties are the relatively high tariff barriers 
for EU imports (38.9 and 27.8 per cent) and the higher dependence on customs revenue to 
finance public expenditure (46.5 and 37.5 per cent). Similar to the trade effects, the (average) 
impact on government finances is larger in ESA in comparison to SADC countries. 
 
Table 7: Decline in Import Duties and Budget Deficits 
    Decline in import duties Import duties  Budget 
    % of total % of total % of total  deficit (-) or
 mill.  import  government % of government surplus (+)
Group / country US$  duties revenue
1 GDP revenue
1 % of GDP
    
ESA group -26.8  -29.5 -3.8 -0.7  
Burundi* -6.6  -44.6 -4.8 -0.9 10.9  -1.7
Comoros* -8.6  -52.4 -24.5 -3.9 46.8  -6.0
Congo, Dem. Rep.* -22.7  -40.3 -5.2 -0.4 12.8  -2.3
Djibouti* -18.6  -37.3 -14.0 -3.1 37.5  -10.4
Ethiopia* -44.6  -31.7 -3.7 -0.7 11.7  -10.2
Kenya -69.5  -33.0 -2.0 -0.6 6.1  3.9
Madagascar* -4.2  -41.1 -0.9 -0.1 2.2 -8.2
Malawi* -5.2  -14.2 -1.6 -0.3 11.3  -14.6
Mauritius -76.5  -39.3 -9.3 -1.7 23.6  -6.2
Rwanda* -4.9  -36.4 -2.2 -0.3 5.9  -9.5
Seychelles -18.6  -46.2 -8.7 -3.1 18.8  -11.1
Sudan* -76.4  -34.6 -4.3 -0.6 12.4  -0.9
Uganda* -9.7  -14.7 -1.3 -0.2 8.7  -8.9
Zambia* -15.6  -16.5 -1.8 -0.4 11.1  -13.9
Zimbabwe -20.6  -15.3 -1.0 -0.2 6.4  -11.6
    
SADC group -21.2 -24.6 -2.0 -0.4  
Angola* -88.1  -55.2 -2.0 -0.8 3.6  -9.0
Botswana -5.2  -3.4 -0.2 -0.1 6.4  6.1
Lesotho* -0.3  -1.4 -0.1 -0.03 5.7  -2.5
Mozambique* -16.7  -21.6 -3.3 -0.5 15.4  -21.4
Namibia -4.3  -2.8 -0.4 -0.1 15.6 -4.0
Swaziland -0.8  -1.1 -0.3 -0.1 24.1 -3.8
Tanzania -32.7  -22.0 -5.5 -0.3 24.9  -1.6
    
ESA + SADC  -48.0  -27.6 -3.1 -0.6  
Sources: UNCTAD (2005), World Bank (2005), IMF (2005) and own calculations. Notes: 
1Government 
revenues excluding grants. See Table 1 for base years. *Least-developed country. 
 
 19Apart from Comoros and Djibouti, there are also relatively large revenue effects in Mauritius 
and Seychelles, with a decline of around 9 per cent of total government revenue or 1.7 and 3.1 
per cent of Gross Domestic Product, respectively. In most other East and Southern African 
countries, total government revenue in is likely to decline by 1 to 5 per cent. In view of the – 
in some cases – considerable budget deficits in African ACP countries (Table 7) and the 
severe difficulties in raising revenues to finance public spending, these are relatively large 
figures, which are likely to have a strong impact on government finances. 
For that reason, unavoidable government revenue losses need to be mitigated. In principle, 
this could be done by a more or less comprehensive tax or fiscal reform. It is widely 
recognised that trade taxes should be replaced with domestic indirect taxes. In theory, it is 
straightforward to replace import tariffs with domestic taxes. An import tariff, for example, is 
equivalent to an ad valorem (domestic) consumption tax and an ad valorem (domestic) 
production subsidy. Yet in reality most ESA countries already started in the 1990s 
implementing tax reforms, including the introduction of a value added tax system. However, 
experience has shown that they are often encountering severe difficulties in replacing import 
tariffs with other taxes or in collecting taxes domestically at all. Due to tax evasion, 
complicated tax systems and often low enforcement efforts, collecting taxes is relatively 
inefficient in many developing countries. According to calculations by Baunsgaard and Keen 
(2005), the recovery rate for lost trade tax revenue for middle-income countries has been in 
the order of 45 to 60 cents for each dollar. Yet revenue recovery has been extremely weak in 
low-income countries, since they have recovered less than about 30 cents of each lost dollar. 
Unfortunately, 15 out of 23 East and Southern African nations are least-developed countries. 
What is more worrying, they are the countries that are most dependent on trade tax revenues. 
All of the above points out at the need to strengthen tax enforcement mechanisms, but also at 
the difficulty of doing so. 
Another issue arises from the assumption of competitive markets, which has been made in our 
calculations. For the projected trade and budget effects, we made the crucial assumption that 
European firms will reduce their export prices in line with the tariff elimination. In case of 
low competition intensities at the product level, however, the dismantling of trade barriers 
would place large European firms into a position with some market power. If European firms 
take advantage of that situation, maintain their prices at current levels (“pricing to market”) 
 20and increase their profits instead, ESA and SADC countries will simply lose customs revenue 
and thus, economic welfare will certainly decline. 
 
5.  Policy Options and Prerequisites for the EPAs 
Given the likely significant trade and budget effects in a number of ESA and SADC countries, 
Economic Partnership Agreements would expose these countries to considerable structural 
adjustment costs, which arise from a reallocation of resources and the need to restructure 
indirect tax systems. Therefore, East and Southern African countries have ample reasons to 
reconsider their trade policy strategies and thoroughly assess alternative policy options at 
hand. Principally, they can opt for the proposed Economic Partnership Agreements or instead 
make use of the unilateral, non-reciprocal trade preferences, which the European Commission 
is already granting. In addition, they can continue to manage gradual liberalisation of their 
regional trade in the framework of existing regional integration schemes. Finally, they can 
liberalise unilaterally or in the course of current or future multilateral trade negotiations.
16
It appears that the least-developed countries have little incentive at the moment to participate 
in an Economic Partnership Agreement from a trade and revenue perspective, because they 
would hardly gain additional access to European markets in return for opening up their own 
market. Since March 2001, the Everything but Arms (EBA) initiative provides almost free 
access to imports from least-developed countries (European Union 2001). Conditions will 
gradually become even more generous in the future, when residual tariffs and quotas on 
bananas, rice and sugar are phased out latest by July 2009. Moreover, the EBA regulations are 
supposed to be maintained for an unlimited period of time and should not be subject to 
periodic renewals. Even rules of origins, which currently constraint least-developed countries 
from using EBA preferences (Brenton 2003, Brenton and Manchin 2003), have been 
liberalised in the course of the EU’s recent GSP reform as of 1 April 2005, including 
allowance for inter-regional cumulation among regional groupings and the elimination of the 
value added rule criterion (European Commission 2004c, 2005b). 
                                                 
16 While this would reduce or eliminate trade diversion effects and “pricing to market” behaviour” by European 
exporters, tariff revenue would further decline (Hinkle and Schiff 2004). 
 21Although the EBA offer appears as a sustainable political commitment, the European Union 
could still make use of the general safeguard clause, graduate most competitive products from 
certain beneficiaries or exclude a country totally, when it is removed from the official list of 
least-developed countries provided by the United Nations. Thus, least-developed countries do 
not hold a legal right to utilise EBA-preferences once and for all. Under an Economic 
Partnership Agreement, in contrast, least-developed countries would be contractual partners 
entitled to export on the terms which are agreed upon in a binding internal treaty, although 
standard safeguards would also be part of the agreements.  
Moreover, an EPA appears to be an attractive option if integration into the world economy is 
part of the development strategy anyway. An EPA with the European Union could be a new 
impetus for liberalising domestic and external affairs. Related reforms could find more 
domestic support and would thus be more sustainable (“lock-in effect”). Also, an EPA could 
explicitly include commitments by the European Commission for technical and financial 
support to master related problems and cover sizeable adjustment costs. Likewise, multilateral 
agencies could provide additional financial and technical support. 
Since 12 out of 16 of the ESA countries and three out of seven of SADC countries are least-
developed countries, the two EPA projects in the region depend on their participation. In 
order to involve them in an EPA, the European Commission not only needs to offer an EBA-
like product coverage and equivalent preferential margins, but has to even go a step further. 
For instance, the European Commission could provide less restrictive and simplified rules of 
origin, concessions for trade in services and immigration rules, reduction of non-tariff 
barriers, financial support to cover part of the adjustment costs and technical assistance to 
manage the process of structural change (Hinkle and Schiff 2004).  
ACP countries that do not belong to the group of least-developed countries would ceteris 
paribus be better off opting for an EPA as far as market access is concerned, since it is likely 
that the latter will offer better conditions than the more restrictive GSP option, to which they 
would have to revert, should they decide not to negotiate. Secured access to Europe’s markets 
is a strong argument in favour of an EPA also for these countries, providing producers with a 
much more stable, long-term framework for export-oriented investment decisions. This 
advantage must, however, be balanced with the challenges and costs of structural adjustment. 
Thus, Economic Partnership Agreements will not come without risks for ACP countries.  
 22A fundamental prerequisite for the EPA option is the clearance of overlapping regional 
integration schemes in East and Southern Africa. Not only do both African groupings consist 
of least-developed and non-least-developed countries, but commitment to trade reform, both 
in terms of external and intra-regional liberalisation, differs substantially among SADC and 
ESA members as well. Accommodating these diverse interests may require a lot of flexibility 
in program design, taking into account the various stages of regional integration processes 
that are currently underway parallel to EPA negotiations. In fact, as several authors have 
suggested, the proposed Economic Partnership Agreements can provide an important impetus 
to the rationalisation and advancement of those processes (de la Rocha 2003). Yet if they are 
to complement and reinforce integration in the region, then important and difficult decisions 
to correct some of the current deficiencies will have to be taken. 
An important unresolved geographical-organisational issue concerns the recently established 
customs union of the East African Community, two members of which (Kenya and Uganda) 
are participating in the ESA group while the third (Tanzania) has elected to join the SADC 
group. The establishment of a customs union implies the harmonisation of the trade policy 
among all members, including application of common tariffs and joint negotiations of trade 
agreements. The current overlapping membership of the East African Community countries, 
in SADC of Tanzania and in COMESA of Kenya and Uganda, is clearly not conducive to a 
common trade policy and creates numerous problems for the implementation of the common 
external tariff and liberalisation of regional intra-trade. This situation can only worsen if 
EPAs are negotiated separately by members of the East African Community, given the weight 
of the European Union as the principal source of imports. Therefore, the three members of the 
East African Community countries may consider forming their own separate EPA group. 
The situation for SACU countries is particularly complex: Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and 
Swaziland are all ACP members and, therefore, part of the SADC group negotiating an 
Economic Partnership Agreement. However, South Africa, which is the biggest SACU 
member and which has a central role in determining SACU’s trade policies, is neither an ACP 
country nor is it included in EPA negotiations. Instead, South Africa has already signed a 
separate free trade agreement with the European Union, many aspects of which apply de facto 
 23to the other SACU countries.
17 Thus, even though South Africa is not covered by the trade 
provisions of the Cotonou Agreement, its free trade agreement with the European Union will 
affect the EPAs between the European Union and the other members of SACU. To address 
this problem, the European Union needs to consider including South Africa in the EPA 
negotiations in some way, in order to ensure some form of harmonisation of the EPA 
agreement and the free trade agreement between the European Union and South Africa.  
As for SADC, its member countries are divided in two groups for the EPA negotiations. 6 of 
its 13 members are negotiating with the ESA group led by COMESA. The rest are grouped 
under the so-called SADC group, which is de facto a SACU + 3. The current situation will 
likely imply the end of SADC as a meaningful trading arrangement, and the consolidation of 
SACU as the real trade hub in Southern Africa. The former contradicts one of the stated 
objectives of the EPA negotiations of strengthening and deepening regional integration.  
Above all, the EBA initiative has complicated the EPA process by creating different trading 
environments and negotiating incentives for the least-developed and non-least-developed 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa. This situation is anomalous and again it does not really help 
strengthen the regional integration process, which is supposed to be one of the objectives of 
the Cotonou Agreement. For this reason, the European Commission should consider offering 
EBA-like preferences to all ACP countries in the EPA negotiations. 
There are many issues that have to be addressed and successfully dealt with in the current 
EPA negotiations, in order to ensure that they really achieve the development objectives 
envisaged in the Cotonou Agreement. Like their counterparts in other ACP sub-regions, the 
East and Southern African countries should carefully ponder the advantages and 
disadvantages of signing Economic Partnership Agreements with the European Union. This 
paper has attempted to assess some of the risks for East and Southern African countries, in 
terms of impact on trade flows and government revenue from a full tariff liberalisation of EU 
imports. The results suggest that the impact will not be negligible for most countries, and 
potentially very important for a number of them. In addition, the need to consolidate regional 
trading arrangements in East and Southern Africa arises whether EPAs would be concluded or 
not. 
                                                 
17 To complicate things further, SACU is currently in the process of negotiating a free trade agreement with the 
United States, its second largest trading partner. 
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 26Appendix: Data Sources 
Variable Source 
Trade (Q1, Q2)  Imports: TRAINS (UNCTAD 2005) 
  Imports and exports: COMTRADE (ITC 2005) 
Tariff (t)  UNCTAD (2005), IMF (2005) for Comoros 
Customs revenue (CR)  IMF (2005) 
Government revenue  IMF (2005) 
Gross domestic product  World Bank (2005) 
Import demand elasticity (ε)  See Table 3 
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